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n early 2006, landowners in Boiling Springs Lakes,
N.C., began clear-cutting timber from their prop-
erty after the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (fws)
announced that development could threaten local
red-cockaded woodpecker populations. The fws
released a map showing clusters of the woodpeck-
er in the area and announced plans to identify
additional habitat for the endangered bird. That prompted
landowners to grab their chainsaws to clear their property of
the trees in which the woodpeckers make their homes before
their land could be designated as endangered species habitat. 
Residents of Boiling Springs Lakes are not anti-environ-
mental or particularly hostile to endangered birds. Red-cock-
aded woodpeckers have thrived there for years. “People are just
afraid a bird might fly in and make a nest and their proper-
ty is worth nothing,” Boiling Springs Lakes mayor Joan Kin-
ney told local papers. “It is causing a tremendous amount of
clear-cutting.” As one local resident told a reporter, “You had
to get in line to get somebody with a chain saw…. I have not
a single pine tree left. Folks around here are terrified of the
prospect of losing their property. That causes people to get
out there and find out what they can do to protect them-
selves.” In just eight months, the city issued 368 logging per-
mits but few building permits, leaving many empty lots
throughout the area. 
The rampant clear-cutting in Boiling Springs Lakes was a
predictable, if highly regrettable, consequence of the eco-
nomic incentives the Endangered Species Act (esa) creates for
private landowners. Under Section 9 of the act, it is illegal for
a private landowner to engage in activities that could “harm”
an endangered species, including habitat modification, with-
out first obtaining a federal permit. Knowing violations can
lead to fines of up to $25,000 and even jail time. As a practi-
cal matter, the law requires private landowners to obtain per-
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mission from the fws before modifying endangered species
habitat on their own land. However, it is not illegal to modi-
fy land that might become endangered species habitat some
day in the future, nor are landowners required to take affir-
mative steps to maintain endangered species habitat. So, in
Boiling Springs Lakes as elsewhere, landowners seek to avoid
the burden of the esa by eliminating potential species habi-
tat on their land.
ANECDOTES AND DATA
Economists have been critical of the esa’s perverse incentives
for years. In the most basic terms, the act penalizes and thus
discourages the creation and maintenance of species habitat
on private land. According to University of Arizona economist
Robert Innes, “the possibility of uncompensated takings gives
landowners an incentive to develop their property early on in
order to reduce the risk that it will later be appropriated for
public use.” Such incentives have consequences. As Robert J.
Smith wrote in Regulation 15 years ago, “The perverse incen-
tive structure of the act accelerates destruction of the very
habitat the act was designed to protect.”
Anecdotal accounts of landowners who have sought to
avoid having “endangered species problems” on their land are
rampant. In Texas, property owners raze juniper tree stands
favored by golden-cheeked warblers, while in California’s
Central Valley landowners disc brush and low-lying habitat
favored by small endangered mammals such as kangaroo
rats. There are even stories of landowners who “shoot, shov-
el, and shut up” when they encounter endangered species on
or near their land. 
Some environmental activists dismiss anecdotal accounts of
the esa’s perverse incentives. “Anecdote is not the singular of
data,” they explain, stressing that the occasional horror story
does not demonstrate that there is something fundamentally
wrong with the act. But others have begun to recognize that the
esa’s perverse incentives can create real problems for species
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management practices in North Carolina. Specifically, the
study looked at whether private landowners engage in pre-
emptive habitat destruction when the presence of the wood-
peckers places landowners at risk of federal regulation and a
loss of their timber investment. 
Consistent with economic theory, Lueck and Michael
found that “increases in the probability of esa land-use restric-
tions, as measured by a landowner’s proximity to existing
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conservation. Writing in Conser-
vation Biology, a group of wildlife
biologists observed that “the
regulatory approach to con-
serving endangered species and
diminishing habitats has creat-
ed anti-conservation sentiment
among many private landown-
ers who view endangered species
as economic liabilities.” As they
explain,
Landowners fear a decline in
the value of their properties
because the esa restricts
future land-use options where
threatened or endangered
species are found [near] by
[and] makes no provisions for
compensation. Consequently,
endangered species are
perceived by many landowners
as a financial liability, result-
ing in anticonservation incen-
tives because maintaining
high-quality habitats that 
harbor or attract endangered
species would represent a 
gamble against loss of future
opportunities.
The policy question today is not
whether the esa creates incen-
tives for private landowners to
work against the conservation
of endangered species, but
whether those incentives are so
pervasive that the act is actual-
ly doing more harm than good.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Where there was once little
more than economic theory
and anecdotal accounts upon
which to criticize the perform-
ance of the esa, today there is
a growing body of empirical
evidence that the act’s regula-
tory provisions undermine
species conservation on private
land. Four recent studies show that the incentives created by
the esa cause systematic changes in private landowner behav-
ior to the detriment of habitat conservation efforts. Taken
together, the studies provide powerful evidence that the esa
may be endangering endangered species on private land.
In 2003, Dean Lueck and Jeffrey Michael published a paper
in the Journal of Law and Economics examining the effect of
endangered red-cockaded woodpecker populations on timber
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[woodpecker] colonies, increase the probability of forest har-
vest and decrease the age at which timber is harvested.” Pro-
viding habitat for a single red-cockaded woodpecker colony
can cost up to $200,000 in foregone timber harvests. To avoid
the loss, landowners at greatest risk of esa-imposed restric-
tions were most likely to harvest their forestlands prematurely
and reduce the length of their timber harvesting rotations.
Cutting timber stands prematurely deprives red-cockaded
woodpeckers of habitat because the birds only inhabit older
trees. According to the Lueck-Michael study, the ultimate
consequences were potentially significant, amounting to sev-
eral thousand acres of lost woodpecker habitat, enough to pro-
vide habitat for between 25 and 76 red-cockaded woodpeck-
er colonies. That is a significant habitat loss for a species
dependent upon private land for its survival.
A second study on the effect of red-cockaded woodpeck-
er populations on timber practices by Daowei Zhang in Eco-
nomic Inquiry reinforced the Lueck and Michael findings.
Zhang found that “regulatory uncertainty and lack of pos-
itive economic incentives alter landowner timber harvesting
behavior and hinder endangered species conservation on
private lands.” Absent such uncertainty, “landowners choose
among harvesting methods to maximize stumpage revenue
… subject to constraints such as forest stand characteris-
tics…, aesthetics, management objective, and tax liability.”
The threat of regulatory prohibitions on timber activity
under the esa, however, alters landowners’ calculations.
Zhang found that “a landowner is 25% more likely to cut
forests when he or she knows or perceives that a red-cockaded
woodpecker cluster is within a mile of the land than other-
wise.” The threat of esa regulation also increases the likeli-
hood that a landowner would engage in clear-cutting when
harvesting the timber, as opposed to a selective harvesting
technique that may have less ecological impact. On that
basis, Zhang concluded, “at least for the [woodpecker], the
esa has a strong negative effect on habitat,” and the effect
appears to be “substantial.” 
Zhang’s results largely confirm the Lueck-Michael findings.
As Zhang reported, 
Despite the use of different data, the basic conclusions
reached in these two studies are similar: the ESA regulations
actually lead landowners [to] cut their timber sooner, to the
detriment of the [red-cockaded woodpecker], than they oth-
erwise would do. As a consequence, [woodpecker] habitats
have been reduced on private lands because of the ESA. In
this case the ESA imposes costs but does not generate con-
servation benefits.
The perverse incentives of the esa do not simply affect the
woodpeckers and other species dependent upon private tim-
berland in the southeastern United States. A study by envi-
ronmental researchers Amara Brook, Michaela Zint, and
Raymond de Young published in Conservation Biology looked
at landowner responses to the listing of the endangered Pre-
ble’s Meadow jumping mouse, a small, nocturnal rodent
native to parts of Wyoming and Colorado. The study con-
ducted surveys of private landowners within the animal’s
range and found that a significant number of landowners
took actions to make their lands less hospitable to the mouse
after it was listed as an endangered species. While some
landowners sought to improve the quality of the habitat on
their land, the survey responses suggested that “the efforts
of landowners who acted to help the Preble’s were cancelled
by those who sought to harm it.” On that basis, the study
concluded, “The current regulatory approach to the con-
servation of rare species is insufficient to protect the Preble’s
mouse.” Indeed, the authors were forced to conclude that “as
more landowners become aware that their land contains
Preble’s habitat, it is likely that the impact on the species may
be negative.”
The Brook findings illustrate the factors that motivate
landowner behavior with regard to endangered species. Some
landowners indicated a willingness to help the Preble’s Mead-
ow jumping mouse upon hearing it was endangered, pre-
sumably because they wished to help an endangered species.
Their positive reaction was not dependent upon the regula-
tory strictures of the esa but on their belief in the importance
of species conservation or other values. Those landowners
who expressed intent to destroy potential habitat on their
land, on the other hand, are unlikely to have been motivated
by a visceral hostility to endangered species or conservation
more broadly. It is more likely that those who took negative
actions did so because of the threat of regulation and its
potential economic consequences. Without esa regulation,
the existence of the jumping mouse would have posed no
economic threat to private landowners and the likely effect of
the mouse’s listing would have been a a net increase in con-
servation efforts on private lands. Instead, the positive efforts
of some landowners were “cancelled” by those who took neg-
ative actions in response to the act.
The Conservation Biology study also found evidence that the
esa discourages private landowners from cooperating with
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environmental researchers. Specifically, it found that landown-
ers would refuse to give biologists permission to conduct
research on their land to assess mouse populations out of fear
that land-use restrictions would follow the discovery of a
mouse on their land. “Many landowners appeared to defend
themselves against having their land-management options
restricted by refusing to allow surveys for the Preble’s,” the
Brook study reported. That is a grave concern because accu-
rate data on species populations and their habitat are essen-
tial to successful conservation efforts. Not only is the esa dis-
couraging landowners from maintaining habitat, but the act
could be obstructing the accumulation of data about what
species are in need of protection in the first place.
A fourth study of uncompensated esa regulation by econ-
omists John List, Michael Margolis, and Daniel Osgood
sought to measure “the extent to which landowners act to pre-
empt regulation during the urban growth process” by accel-
erating the rate at which land is developed. The study focused
on landowner responses to the threat of regulation of habi-
tat for the Cactus Ferruginous pygmy owl near Tucson, Ariz.,
and found evidence that the threat of esa regulation accel-
erates the rate at which privately owned species habitat is
developed. Specifically, the study found that land designat-
ed as critical owl habitat was, on average, developed one year
earlier than equivalent parcels that were not designated as
habitat. This acceleration of development was facilitated in
part because the pygmy owl was listed and proposed critical
habitat was published months before regulatory responses
were imposed, “allowing landowners ample time to respond.”
Those findings are reinforced by additional data showing
that the value of undeveloped land designated as critical
habitat fell relative to other lands in the study area. Although
as a strict legal matter critical habitat designation is not nec-
essary for land to be burdened by the esa’s regulatory stric-
tures, it provides a signal to landowners about the likelihood
of future regulatory restraints. 
While the List study focused on the timing of develop-
ment, it should be noted that government actions that encour-
age more rapid development can be expected to result in more
net development. For ecological purposes, the decision to
develop land can be irreversible. Once habitat is lost, it can be
difficult to replace. At the same time, land that is not devel-
oped today can still be conserved or protected before it is
developed tomorrow. Thus, preventing — or, at least, avoiding
creating incentives for — premature development serves the
ultimate goal of ecological conservation.
CONCLUSION
These studies, taken together, provide powerful evidence that
the esa is discouraging species conservation on private land.
Worse, they suggest that the net effect of the esa on private
land could be negative. Given that habitat loss and fragmen-
tation represent the greatest threat to endangered species,
this should be of concern to wildlife conservationists. Indeed,
the incentives created by the esa should be of even greater con-
cern because private land is indispensable to environmental
conservation. 
Most land — approximately two-thirds of the continental
United States — is privately owned. The relative importance
of such lands for the maintenance of species habitat and crit-
ical ecological functions is perhaps even greater. Over three-
fourths of those species currently listed as threatened or
endangered under the esa rely upon private land for some or
all of their habitat, according to the U.S. Government Account-
ability Office. 
Without active conservation on private lands, meaningful
ecological conservation cannot be achieved — and the available
evidence suggests that it is failing. Only a handful of species
listed as endangered or threatened in the past three decades
have “recovered,” according to the fws, and it is debatable
whether there has been a single “success” story as a result of
the regulation of habitat modification on private land.
Instead, as the recent studies indicate, there is evidence that
esa regulation may be causing conservation failures.
Years ago, Aldo Leopold wrote of the need for a new land
ethic among landowners to safeguard and steward the land.
Given the dependence of endangered species on private land,
such a land ethic is essential if many species are going to con-
tinue to survive in the wild. Yet today we are learning that the
nation’s primary wildlife conservation law may be doing more
harm than good, discouraging the very land ethic necessary
for endangered species’ survival. The purpose of the esa is to
conserve endangered and threatened species. Instead it appears
that the act may be endangering them.
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